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CAROL M. PARKER*

The Pipeline Industry Meets Grief
Unimaginable: Congress Reacts with
the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act
of 2002
ABSTRACT
In response to several devastating pipeline accidents, Congress
implemented major changes to the nation's pipeline safety laws.
By way of background, this article (1) describes the accident
history leading to the passage of the new law, (2) explains basic
pipeline operation, and (3) identifies the people and agencies that
lobbied for change. The article then summarizes the legislative
history of the new law, including some of the bills that Congress
considered in the immediately preceding years. It explains the
sections of the new statute and highlights the changes Congress
made. The article illustrates how the new statute would have
affected past accidents, had it been in place earlier,and goes on to
identify where Congress fell short. Finally, the article suggests
additional measures that Congress could impose if the new law
fails to reduce the frequency and severity of pipeline accidents.
I. PROLOGUE
On August 19, 2000, five-year-old Kirsten Sumler was enjoying
the great American outdoors with her mother, Amanda Smith. They
were camping and fishing on the banks of the Pecos River with ten other
members of their extended family. Six hundred and seventy-five feet
away, an El Paso pipeline ruptured. In an instant, six family members
were burned alive. The six survivors sought shelter in the river, as the
*
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500-foot tall flame roared over their heads for almost an hour. When
rescuers arrived, one badly burned victim begged to be shot. As the
rescuers tried to evacuate Kirsten, she cried, not wanting to leave her
mother. Amanda told her to go. She promised that the fireman would
take good care of her. Unfortunately, Kirsten was burned well beyond
the point where good care would help; she died later at the burn unit.
Her mother, Amanda, and the four remaining family members also died
of their injuries.
Amanda's promise to her daughter that she would be well taken
care of embodies the promise that Americans expect from the pipeline
industry and from the federal government's pipeline safety laws. These
twelve people died because there was no requirement to inspect
pipelines - ever - anywhere. These victims were not the first to die from
unsafe pipelines and they may not be the last. This article describes what
Congress did about the accident and where Congress fell short.
II. INTRODUCTION
On December 17, 2002, President Bush signed the new Pipeline
Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (H.R. 3609). The law capped years of
efforts by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), state
governments, and others to strengthen pipeline safety laws. The safety
record from 2000 catalyzed the change:
* An El Paso Energy natural gas pipeline exploded near Carlsbad,
1
New Mexico, killing 12 campers. The incident "contributed
2
significantly" to the California energy crisis and New Mexico's
3
unimaginable."
governor referred to the scene as one of "grief
4
* A gasoline pipeline rupture contaminated a Dallas water supply
and led to $2.75 5per gallon gasoline and lower air quality in Chicago
and Milwaukee.
1.

Jeff Nesmith & Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Pipelines: The Invisible Danger, AUSTIN AM.-

STATESMAN, July 22, 2001, available at wysiwig:/ /http://www.austin360.com/aas/special

reports/pipelines/22pipecarlsbad.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).

FINAL
2. STAFF OF THE FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, DOCKET No. PA02-2-000,
OF
INVESTIGATION
FACT-FINDING
MARKETS
WESTERN
IN
REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION

POTENTIAL MANIPULATION OF ELECTRIC AND NATURAL GAS PRICES IV-6 (2003) [hereinafter
FERC PRICE MANIPULATION REPORT].

3. 10-fatality Pipeline Blast DeadliestYet, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 21, 2000, at 4.
STAR4. Neil Strassman, Company Won't Pay for Dallas Water Pipeline, FORT WORTH
TELEGRAM, July 14, 2000, available at http://www.newslibrary.com/deliverppdoc.
asp?SMH=354422 (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
5. Melita Marie Garza, Tulsa, Oklahoma Based Explorer Pipeline Co. to Expand Chicago
Petroleum Pipeline, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRiB. BUS. NEWS, Feb. 20, 2001 (on file with author);

Winter 2004]

PIPELINE SAFETY

* A gasoline pipeline rupture in Michigan caused more than 1200
people to evacuate from their homes, several for more than three
6
months.
e A fuel oil pipeline ruptured in Maryland, contaminated miles of the
Patuxent River, and resulted in clean up costs of $71 million dollars. 7
These were just four of the 227 transmission pipeline failures in the year
2000.8 In that year alone, property damages from pipeline incidents
reached a record $197 million 9 and fatalities (16)10 were the highest in 25
years."
More importantly, this record followed a pipeline accident in
Bellingham, Washington, in 1999, where almost a quarter million gallons
of gasoline spilled. 12 The ensuing explosion killed three children,13 sent a

Melita Marie Garza, EPA Reduces Standards to Avoid High Gas Prices in Chicago,
Milwaukee,
KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Mar. 17, 2001 (on file with author) (The Environmental
Protection Agency requires cities to use particularized blends of gasoline to improve
their
air quality. When the pipeline broke, Chicago and Milwaukee were unable to get
sufficient
supplies of the special gasoline, leading to shortages and higher prices. The following
year,
Christine Whitman of the EPA agreed to relax environmental standards in
those cities
stating, "I am very concerned about the potential for price increases caused
by.. factors
such as.. pipeline disruptions.").
6. MICH. STATE POLICE, EMERGENCY MGMT. Div., PETROLEUM AND
NATURAL GAS
PIPELINE ACCIDENTS. RECENT SIGNIFICANT PETROLEUM AND NATURAL
GAS PIPELINE
ACCIDENTS IN MICHIGAN (Nov. 2000), available at www.msp.state.mi.us/division/emd/

hazann2000/20-Pipline_- MIHAZ12.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
7. NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., RUPTURE OF PINEY POINT OIL PIPELINE
AND RELEASE OF
FUEL OIL NEAR CHALK POINT, MARYLAND, Apr. 7, 2000, at 17, 20 (2002)
[hereinafter NTSB
CHALK POINT REPORT].
8. OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY, NATURAL GAS PIPELINE OPERATORS INCIDENT
SUMMARY
STATISTICS BY YEAR, 1/1/1986-8/31/2003
TRANSMISSION OPERATORS, available at
http://ops.dot.gov/stats/tras sum.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004)
[hereinafter OPS
NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION SUMMARY] (showing 80 natural gas
transmission pipeline
incidents in 2000); OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY, HAZARDOUS LIQUID
PIPELINE OPERATORS
ACCIDENT SUMMARY STATISTICS BY YEAR, 1/1/1986-9/30/2003, available
at http://ops.dot.

gov.stats/lqsum.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004) [hereinafter OPS LIQUID TRANSMISSION
SUMMARY] (showing 147 hazardous liquid transmission pipeline incidents in 2000).

9. OPS NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION SUMMARY, supra note 8; OPS
LIQUID TRANSMISSION SUMMARY, supra note 8.
10. OPS NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION SUMMARY, supra note 8; OPS
LIQUID TRANSMISSION SUMMARY, supranote 8.
11. Press Release, U.S. Rep. Tom Udall, Udall Hails President's Signature
on Pipeline
Safety and Security Legislation (Dec. 17, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Udall Press

Release].
12.
NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., PIPELINE RUPTURE AND SUBSEQUENT
FIRE IN
BELLINGHAM, WASHINGTON JUNE 10, 1999, at 1 (2002) [hereinafter
NTSB BELLINGHAM
REPORT].

13.

Id. at l, 8.
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14
fireball a mile and a half long through the heart of a city of 69,850
6
15
people, and created a mushroom cloud six miles high. Damage18claims
17
today.
litigated
exceeded half a billion dollars and are still being
These accidents illustrate an unrecognized hazard of pipelines.
Because pipelines transport high volumes, a single, isolated accident has
the potential to be catastrophic. As reported by the NTSB, a single
pipeline accident "can injure hundreds of persons, affect thousands
more, and cost millions of dollars in.. .property damage, loss of work
opportunity, community disruption, ecological damage, and insurance
liability." 19 Although pipeline accidents are infrequent, their devastating
20
and are making
consequences have damaged public 21confidence
arduous.
pipelines
new
for
sites
locating
On the other hand, pipelines efficiently transport liquid and gas
materials. A modestly sized pipeline transports the equivalent of 750
22
tanker trucks of gasoline in one day. Our 161,189 miles of liquid
24
pipelines 23 and 307,524 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines
25
provide 68 percent of the nation's gasoline and virtually all of its

Skye Thompson, Olympic Pipeline Explosion: A Retrospective (One Year Later), THE
Retrospective].
PLANET, Spring/Summer 2000, at 4-5 [hereinafter Olympic Pipeline
15. Bellingham.org web site, www.bellingham.org/bellingham.asp (last visited May
25,, 2004).
16. Olympic PipelineRetrospective, supra note 14.
v.
17. ARCO's Answer, Counterclaims and Cross-Claim at 8, Olympic Pipe Line Co.
for
claim
Arco's
(estimating
C01-1310)
(No.
2001)
Equilon Pipeline Co. LLC (W.D. Wash.
supra note
the loss of use of its refinery at $563,603,764), but see NTSB BELLINGHAM REPORT,
million).
$45
than
more
were
damages
12, at 1 (estimating that total property
18. W.D. WASH., CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE NO. 2:01-CV-01310-RSL (Nov. 3, 2003).
19. NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAFETY STUDY-PROTECTING PUBLIC SAFETY THROUGH
EXCAVATION DAMAGE PREVENTION 1 (1997) [hereinafter NTSB EXCAVATION DAMAGE
PREVENTION STUDY].
RULE,
20. OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY, KEY POINTS ON GAS INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
2004).
26,
Feb.
visited
(last
available at http://ops.dot.gov/whatsnew/GASIMPbriefstb.htm
21. See, e.g., Fight Pressed to Reroute Gas Pipeline, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 15, 2002 (on
file with author); Stop the Pipeline, web site, available at http://ctstopthepipeline.com/
Fears
pages/safety.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004); Christine MacDonald, Residents Voice
author).
with
file
(on
2002
5,
Jan.
J.,
STATE
LANSING
Over ProposedPipeline,
22. NAT'L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 7-9 (2001)
[hereinafter NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY].
23. OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY, LIQUID PIPELINE OPERATOR TOTAL NATIONAL MILEAGE,
OPS
available at http://ops.dot.gov/stats/lpo.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004) [hereinafter
LIQUID MILEAGE].
at
24. OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY, NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ANNUAL MILEAGE, available
OPS
http://ops.dot.gov/stats/GTANNUAL2.HTM (last visited Feb. 26, 2004) [hereinafter
GAS MILEAGE].
25. Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline
Quality,
Safety Act Before the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce Subcomm. on Energy & Air
14.
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natural gas.26 Furthermore, pipelines have the lowest number of fatalities
annually of any mode of transportation. 27
However, pipelines are near homes, schoolyards, and churches,
highlighting the need for safety. 28 Furthermore, many of the nation's
pipelines are 30 to 50 years old.29 Periodically verifying their integrity is
essential - both to protect communities near pipelines and those who
depend upon the materials they bring. Yet, in 2000, pipelines remained
uninspected and unsafe.
A. The Gathering Storm of Protest That Led Congress to Act
1. The National TransportationSafety Board
As the NTSB studied and reported about accidents, it grew
increasingly frustrated with the federal Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS).
Time after time, OPS ignored NTSB recommendations, and preventable
accidents continued to occur. 30
NTSB Chairman Jim Hall criticized industry tactics to reduce
OPS funding and to oppose stronger regulations. In a speech to the
Association of Oil Pipelines, he suggested that such efforts were
shortsighted and envisioned the possibility of criminal charges. 31 This
prediction proved prescient when convictions resulted from the
Bellingham accident.3 2 This was the first time in the 30-year history of
pipeline safety laws that criminal sanctions were imposed.33
While the NTSB was investigating the 1999 Bellingham pipeline
accident, the Board received further cause for alarm when an accident
Mar. 19, 2002 (statement of William Shea, President and CEO Buckeye Pipeline
Company,
L.P.).
26.
27.

NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, supra note 22, at 7-11.
NTSB EXCAVATION DAMAGE PREVENTION STUDY, supra note 19.

28. Chuck Moseman, Project Director, Shell Pipeline Co. LP, Our Pipeline
Supports
Stronger Regulations and Commits to Safety, E. MOUNTAIN TELEGRAPH, Sept.
12, 2002, at 5.
29. Pipeline Safety: Hearing before the National Transportation Safety Board,
Nov. 15, 2000
(remarks of Chairman Jim Hall) [hereinafter NTSB PipelineSafety Hearing].
30. Jim Hall, Chairman, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Address to the Ass'n of
Oil Pipelines
(Dec. 1, 1999).
31. Id.
32. See Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Frank Hopf, Jr. (W.D. Wash.
2002) (No.
CR01-338R); Plea Agreement at 1-2, United States v. Ronald Dean Brentson
(W.D. Wash.
2002) (No. CR01-338R); Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Olympic Pipe
Line Co. (W.D.
Wash. 2002) (No. CR01-338R); Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Equilon
Pipeline Co.,
LLC (W.D. Wash. 2002) (No. CR01-338); Plea Agreement at 1, United States
v. Kevin Scott
Dyvig (W.D. Wash. 2002) (No. CR01-338R).
33. Steve Miletich, Execs in Pipeline Blast Get Prison Time -A First, SEATrLE
TIMES, June
19, 2003 (on file with author).
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34
occurred near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Twelve people were camping on
the banks of the Pecos River, 675 feet away from where the pipeline
ruptured. 35 Natural gas under high pressure spewed into their campsite
36
and reached their campfire. The ensuing explosion set off seismographs
38
37
14 miles away, with 500-foot high flames that burned for almost an40
from their injuries.
hour. 39 Six campers died instantly; six died later
Additionally, the explosion extensively damaged nearby steel suspen42 and interrupted pipeline
sion bridges, 41 destroyed three vehicles,
43
interruption "contributed
service for almost a year. That service 44
crisis. A federal grand jury is
significantly" to the California energy
45
presently investigating the accident.
Immediately afterwards, NTSB Chairman Hall again voiced
concern saying, "No American would want to use any transportation
vehicle that would not be properly inspected for 48 years, nor should we
have pipelines traveling through any of our communities in this
recommending periodic inspections of
condition." 46 NTSB had been 47
avail.
no
to
pipelines since 1987,
NTSB's report on the Carlsbad accident concluded that corrosion
developing inside the pipeline went undetected because El Paso's
corrosion control program "failed to prevent, detect, or control internal
48
corrosion within the company's pipeline." The NTSB also criticized

GAS PIPELINE
34. NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., PIPELINE ACCIDENT REPORT: NATURAL
(2003) [hereinafter
1
at
2000,
19,
AUG.
MEXICO
NEW
CARLSBAD,
NEAR
FIRE
AND
RUITURE
CARLSBAD NTSB REPORT].

35.
36.

Id. at l, 9.
(on file with
Ten Dead, Two Cling to Life, ROSWELL DAILY REC. NEWS, Aug. 21, 2000

author) (noting that the campers had a small campfire and a Coleman lantern).
J.,
37. Fritz Thompson, N.M. Tech Instrument Logged 3 Sound Waves, ALBUQUERQUE
Aug. 23, 2000, at Al.
38. CARLSBAD NTSB REPORT, supra note 34, at 12.
at 1.
39. Id.
40. Tania Soussan, Wh~iy, God, Why?, ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 21, 2000, at Al.
41. CARLSBAD NTSB REPORT, supra note 34, at 1.
42. Id.
43. Michael Coleman, Pipeline That Killed Twelve near Carlsbad Reopened, ALBUQUERQUE
J., July 7, 2001 (on file with author).
44. FERC PRICE MANIPULATION REPORT, supra note 2.
45. SEC, FORM 10-Q: EL PASO CORP 32 (Sept. 30, 2003).
Mexico,
46. Press Release, Jim Hall, Chairman, NTSB, Statement on Carlsbad, New
author).
with
file
(on
2000)
24,
(Aug.
Pipeline Accident
Liquid Pipeline
47. Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous
Quality of the
Air
and
Energy
on
Subcomm.
the
before
Safety
Pipeline
on
Testimony
Act:
Safety
Chipkevich,
Robert
of
(statement
2002)
19,
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Mar.
NTSB)
Director, Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations,
[hereinafter Chipkevich testimony].
48. CARLSBAD NTSB REPORT, supra note 34, at 50.
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OPS, noting that the agency had conducted 26 "inspections" of El Paso
Corporation (the pipeline operator) over ten years and never discovered
the faults in its corrosion control program. 49 Nonetheless, after the
accident, OPS had no difficulty finding numerous faults.5 0
2. The States and Their Citizens
Several States shared the concerns of the NTSB. Washington
state representatives asked Congress to protect state (rather than federal)
interstate pipeline company inspections.5' An activist refuted the need
for federal preemption.5 2 A Virginia city attorney complained that his
hometown lost its public water supply to a pipeline failure not once, but
twice. 53 State government inspectors complained to Congress that the
Department of Transportation was summarily limiting states' roles in
inspecting pipeline companies despite statutory language to the contrary 54 and suggested that state inspectors would be better able to
49. Id. at 28, 50.
50. John W. Somerhalder II, Pres., El Paso Energy Pipeline Group, CPF No. 4-2001-1004
(Dep't of Transp. 2001) (notice of probable violation proposed civil penalty and proposed
compliance order for four violations, issued by Southwest Region).
51. Reauthorization of Dep't. of Transp. Office of Pipeline Safety: Before the Subcomm. on
Highways and Transit of the House Transp. Comm. (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement by Chuck
Mosher, Chairman, Washington State Citizens Committee on Pipeline Safety, "We believe
it is critical that OPS be directed in law to establish partnerships with willing states and
delegate to these states authority to oversee interstate pipelines. This is our number one
priority.").
52. Hearing on the Bellingham, Washington, Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Explosion: Before the
Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldgs., Hazardous Materials, and Pipeline Transp. of the House
Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure (Oct. 27, 1999) (testimony of Carl Weimer, Safe
Bellingham, "To take but one obvious example, the trucking industry, whose fleets crisscross our state borders thousands of times a day, are subject to safety requirements at the
state and local level... The sooner states and local government are given the power to
protect their citizens, the sooner we will see significant advances made in safety protection
for this industry.").
53. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp. (May 11, 2000)
(testimony of James M. Pates, City Attorney, Fredericksburg, Va., on behalf of the National
Pipeline Reform Coalition, "In 1980 and again in 1989, my hometown of 20,000 people lost
its public water supply for a week due to oil spills in the Rappahannock River.") [hereinafter Nat'l Pipeline Reform Coalition testimony].
54. Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp. (May 4, 2000) (testimony
of Charles R. Kenow, Vice-Chairman of Nat'l Ass'n of Pipeline Safety Representatives,
[Riecent actions by DOT to summarily limit the states' past role in
inspecting interstate pipelines remains of concern... The removal and
limitation of state resources is analogous to disengaging a seasoned,
trained force and their field commander from the battlefield and replacing
them with a force from a foreign country that does not know the local
customs, people, terrain or rules of engagement... History has proven,
more than once, this isn't the way to win the battle.).
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OPS. 5 The U.S.
conduct more frequent and thorough inspections than
56
General Accounting Office (GAO) agreed with them.
Community activists with spirits forged in the cauldron of the
57
Bellingham explosion testified to Congress. Marlene Robinson, whose
son Liam Wood suffocated on gasoline fumes while fishing, reported,
"Every living thing in the creek was killed for a mile and a half. Trees
58
were incinerated and rocks cracked in the 2000 degree heat." She
complained that OPS rarely imposed fines and required no inspections
59
and that the agency was unduly influenced by the interests of industry.
3. Industry Reaction
In contrast, the industry's position sometimes seemed oblivious
to reality. The Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA)
complained that requiring a specific type of inspection or a required
frequency of inspection of natural gas pipelines would interrupt natural
6
gas service and be too costly to consumers. 0 However, unsafe pipelines
61
could cause interruptions of service, too. In fact, OPS later estimated
that the Carlsbad accident cost California $17.5 million dollars a day in

55. Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline
Safety Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Energy and
Commerce Comm. (Mar. 19, 2002) (statement of James D. Anderson, National Vice-President,
Nat'l Ass'n of Pipeline Safety Representatives, "The ability to inspect these facilities using
OPS guidelines and training will provide assistance to the OPS in performing more
frequently and thorough inspections than have normally been performed due to lack of
OPS resources.").
56. Office of Pipeline Safety Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air
Quality of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Mar. 19, 2002) (testimony of PETER F.
GUERRERO, DIR. OF PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No.
GAO-02-517T, PIPELINE SAFETY: STATUS OF IMPROVING OVERSIGHT OF THE PIPELINE INDUS.

(2002)).
57. The Bellingham, Washington Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Incident: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldgs., Hazardous Materials and Pipeline Transportation of the
House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure(Oct. 27, 1999) (Witness List).
58. Reauthorization of the Office of Pipeline Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Highways and Transit of the House Comm. on Trans. and Infrastructure (Feb. 13, 2002)
(testimony of Marlene Robinson, Safe Bellingham) [hereinafter Robinson testimony].
59.

Id.

60. Reauthorizationof the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline
Safety Act: Hearing on H.R. 3609 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Mar. 19, 2002) (statement of William J. Haener, VicePresident of Natural Gas CMS Engineer Corp., on behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas
Ass'n of Am.) [hereinafter INGAA testimony].
61. Energy Policy Act of 2002, H.R. 4, 148th Cong. § 778a 4-5 (2002); FERC PRICE
MANIPULATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
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higher natural gas prices. 62 If, as suggested by the Carlsbad accident,
undiscovered corrosion were occurring on the nation's aging pipelines,
the absence of inspections would decrease the reliability of service and
would invite interruptions due to unanticipated ruptures.
In another contradiction, industry testimony to Congress
opposed prescriptive legislation; reasoning that "one size fits all" would
not fit pipelines. 63 But less than three weeks after that testimony, the
industry defendants in the Bellingham criminal trial complained that
existing laws were too vague to support a criminal prosecution. 64 It is
hard to see how Congress could make a law less vague without also
making it more prescriptive.
4. The Results
Although the new law did not please everyone, 65 Congress
passed a tougher law with many prescriptive standards. 66 Some
improvements are obvious but others that are equally important are
quite subtle. While the new law is not a model of clarity and strength, a
comparison with its predecessor shows how far Congress came from the
former laissez faire approach to pipeline safety.
Understanding the new Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of
2002 requires a basic understanding of pipelines as well as a survey of
the changes that Congress implemented. With this foundation, we can
then ask whether the new law might have prevented or mitigated
previous accidents, and what more should be done.

62. Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Gas
Transmission Pipelines); Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,778, 69,782 (Dec. 15, 2003) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. Part 192).
63. Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the HazardousLiquid Pipeline
Safety Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce (Mar. 19, 2002) (testimony of Herman Morris, Jr., President and CEO
Memphis Light, Gas & Water) [hereinafter Memphis Light, Gas & Water testimony].
64. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Indictment on Vagueness Grounds at 12, United
States of America v. Olympic Pipe Line Co., (W.D. Wash.) (No. CR01-338R) ("[Elven
industry experts cannot say with certainty what is required by these regulations.").
65. Ellyn Ferguson, Politicians Hail New Pipeline Bill; Father Critical, BELLINGHAM
HERALD, Nov. 16, 2002 (on file with author).
66. Udall Press Release, supra note 11.
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III. UNDERSTANDING PIPELINES
A. Operation
Pipelines are steel pipes 67 that transport liquid and gas materials
68
from where they are extracted or produced to where they are utilized.
Many different materials are transported by pipeline including natural
gas, crude oil, refined products (gasoline, jet fuel, and diesel), natural gas
liquids (including such components as ethane, propane, and butane),
and carbon dioxide. 69 These materials begin their pipeline journey at
7
coastal ports, oil or gas wells, or refineries and may travel thousands of
72
71
miles. The final destination may be a home (natural gas), a refined
73
products terminal that supplies local gas stations (refined products), a
74
petrochemical factory (natural gas liquids), or an oil refinery (crude
oil).75
Pipelines are controlled by a Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition system (SCADA)76 consisting of computer hardware and
software. SCADA regulates pressure and flow and controls pumps and
compressors. Remote sensing units monitor operating conditions along
which
the miles of pipeline and transmit the data to the SCADA system,
77
is centrally located and staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
B. Hazardous Liquid versus Natural Gas Pipelines
The Department of Transportation (DOT) regulates natural gas
and liquid pipelines differently. 78 Gas pipelines are divided into those
that carry gas in large quantities over long distances, transmission

67.

JOHN L. KENNEDY, OIL AND GAS PIPELINE FUNDAMENTALS 49 (2nd ed. 1993).

68. Id. at 1. Most oil and gas pipelines in the United States are constructed of
longitudinally welded pipe, id. at 51, and are coated to prevent corrosion. Id. at 60.
69. Id. at 28-43.
70. Id. at l, 5.
71. Id. at l.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 37.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id. at 215.
77. Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines, Pipeline Industry Facts- Using Control Systems for Pipeline
Operation and Monitoring (2002), available at http://www.aop.org/pubs/2002/Using%20
Control%20Systems%20Final%20Aug%2028.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
78. See Transportation of natural and other gas by pipeline: minimum Federal safety
standards, 49 C.F.R. § 192 (2002); Transportation of hazardous liquids by pipeline, 49 C.F.R.
§ 195 (2002).
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pipelines, and local distribution pipelines. 79 Natural gas pipelines are
divided further into class locations with greater safety measures
80
imposed as population density increases.
Historically, rules governing liquid pipelines did not address
changes in population density. However, in December 2000, the DOT
promulgated new regulations that, for the first time, required liquid
pipeline companies to identify where their pipelines could affect "high
consequence areas" and required inspections in those areas. 81 For liquid
pipelines, high consequence areas include not only areas of high
population but also commercial waterways and other areas that are
"unusually sensitive." 82
C. Monitoring the Integrity of Pipelines
Although SCADA systems "monitor" pipelines, they detect a
problem only by sensing a change in pressure or flow rate. At that point,
however, a release may have already occurred. Because of the potentially
severe consequences, prevention is critically important. Prevention, in
turn, requires monitoring the pipeline's integrity.
Integrity testing begins when a pipeline is first constructed.
Welds are X-rayed 83 and the pipeline is "hydrostatically tested."
Hydrostatic testing requires filling each segment of the pipeline with
water and pressurizing it to determine whether it will hold the
pressure.8 4 Because the hydrostatic testing is done at a higher pressure
than the operating pressure, it is assumed that the pipeline will not
rupture during normal operation. Hydrostatic testing is required for new
pipeline construction. 85 Unfortunately, if hydrostatic testing is used to
test an operating pipeline, it interrupts service 86 and introduces water

79. Compare49 C.F.R. §§ 192.705, .706, .707, .709, .711, .713, .715, .717, .719 (2002) with 49
C.F.R. §§ 192.721, .723 (2002).
80. Class Locations, 49 C.F.R. 192.5 (2002). If, when a pipeline is built, it is in a Class 2
area but more homes are built near the pipeline (changing the classification to Class 3), the
company may be required to operate the pipeline at a lower pressure. See Change in Class
Location: Confirmation or Revision of Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure, 49 C.F.R. §
192.611 (2002).
81. 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.450(1)-(4) (2002) (defining "high consequence areas").
82. Id. §§ (1), (4); 49 C.F.R. § 195.6 (2002) (these include drinking water sources and
environmentally sensitive areas).
83. KENNEDY, supra note 67, at 157.
84. Id. at 162.
85. See 49 C.F.R. § 192.505; 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.302, .304.
86. 68 Fed. Reg. 4278, 4302 (Jan. 28, 2003).
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into the pipeline, which, if not completely removed, may cause
87
corrosion.
Another way of monitoring integrity is with internal inline
88
inspection devices, known as "smart pigs." "Smart pigs" detect some,
89
but not all, defects in a pipeline by creeping through the pipeline and
using magnets and sensors to detect where the pipeline wall "leaks" the
magnetic force field. 90 This leakage happens where the pipe wall has
thinned due to corrosion. Correctly interpreting smart pig data can be
problematic, however. 91 If the pipeline has had prior inspections, a
comparison of a recent report with an older report may reveal time
dependent changes. 92 Highly skilled engineers are integral to an effective
93
internal inspection program.
94
Because many pipelines cannot accommodate a smart pig and
hydrostatic testing is costly and interrupts service, operators depend on
other methods, broadly known as "direct assessment" (DA), to monitor
pipeline integrity. DA is a process in which a pipeline operator integrates
knowledge about the pipeline's characteristics and operating history
with incidents of internal corrosion and information gleaned from
testing of coating condition to make inferences about likely places where
the pipeline's integrity may fail. The company then excavates the
pipeline in such places to examine its integrity directly (hence the name
"direct" assessment). The excavation provides an opportunity to visually
examine the pipeline and perhaps use ultrasound to measure the
thickness of the pipe wall. 95 However, as its name suggests, this method
inspects only the areas chosen for sampling, not the entire pipeline.
Therefore, similar to all studies based on sampling, the results are
suspect because most of the pipeline remains uninspected.

87. Id.
88. NTSB Pipeline Safety Hearing,supra note 29.
89. Hearing on the Bellingham, Washington Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Explosion Before the
Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Pub. Bdlgs., Hazardous Materials, and Pipeline Transp. of the House
Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure (Oct. 27, 1999) (testimony of Rep. Jay Inslee); NTSB
Pipeline Safety Hearing, supra note 29 (testimony of Ravi Krishnamurthy).
90. NTSB Pipeline Safety Hearing, supra note 29 (testimony of Ravi Krishnamurthy).
91. See, e.g., NTSB BELLINGHAM REPORT, supra note 12, at 59-61.
92. Id.
93. NTSB Pipeline Safety Hearing, supra note 29 (testimony of Ravi Krishnamurthy).
94. Hearing Regarding Pipeline Safety Research and Development Before the Subcomm. on
Energy of the House Comm. on Science (Mar. 13, 2002) (testimony of Terry Boss, Vice
Peesident of Environment, Safety and Operations, INGAA) [hereinafter INGAA Pipeline R
& D testimony].
95. Joe L. Pikas, Direct Assessment, Data Integration Important in Establishing Pipeline
Integrity, OIL & GAS J., Sept. 2, 2002, at 66 [hereinafter OGJ Direct Assessment].
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D. Causes of Pipeline Accidents
The most common cause of liquid and natural gas transmission
pipeline accidents is corrosion (about 24 percent), while the most
common cause of an accident on a natural gas distribution pipeline is
96,
outside force damage (57 percent). 97
IV. THE PREVIOUS LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PIPELINE SAFETY
A. Prior Statutes
The first statute regulating pipeline safety was the Natural Gas
Pipeline Safety Act of 1968,98 which Congress amended in 1976. 99
Congress added liquid pipelines to the statute in the Pipeline Safety Act
of 1979.100 Subsequent bills included the Pipeline Safety Reauthorization
Act of 1988,101 the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992,102 the Accountable Pipeline

96. OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY, TRANSMISSION PIPELINE INCIDENT SUMMARY BY CAUSE
1/1/2002-12/31/2002 (2002); OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY, HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE
ACCIDENT SUMMARY BY CAUSE 1/1/2002-12/31/2002 (2002); OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY,
DISTRIBUTION PIPELINE INCIDENT SUMMARY BY CAUSE 1/2/2002-12/31/2002; "Outside force

damage" is a catchall term that includes (1) third party excavation damage, (2) excavation
damage caused by the pipeline company itself, (3) landslides, (4) fire, (5) lightning, (6)
snow, (7) wind, (8) motor vehicle accidents, and (9) vandalism, see Instructions for
Completing Form RSPA F 7100.2 (3-84) Incident Report-Gas Transmission and Gathering
Systems, Part B: Damage by Outside Forces).
97. Another less frequent category deserves mention. Seam weld failure on liquid
pipelines (when the longitudinal seam of the pipe splits open) accounted for only a small
percentage (four to five percent) of pipeline accidents but, in 2002, accounted for more than
a third of the property damages caused by liquid pipelines annually. OFFICE OF PIPELINE
SAFETY, HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE ACCIDENT SUMMARY BY CAUSE 1/1/2002-12/31/2002
(2002), supra note 96; this type of failure occurs almost exclusively on pipelines constructed
before 1970 using a now abandoned welding technique. JOHN F. KIEFNER & CHERYL J.
TRENCH, OIL PIPELINE CHARACTERISTICS AND RISK FACTORS: ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE
DECADE OF CONSTRUCTION 33 (Am. Petroleum Inst. 2001).
98. Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-481, 82 Stat. 720 (1968).
99. Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-477, 90 Stat.
2073 (1976).
100. Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-129, §§ 201-218, 93 Stat. 989 (1979)
(adding the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act in Title II).
101. Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-561, 102 Stat. 2805
(1988).
102. Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-508, 106 Stat. 3289 (1992).
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Safety and Partnership Act of 1996,103 and now the Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2002.104
B. Prior Regulation -The Office of Pipeline Safety
Congress created the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) in 1968105 to
oversee and implement pipeline safety regulations. OPS is housed in the
Department of Transportation (DOT) under the Research and Special
Programs Administration (RSPA). 10 6 OPS oversees interstate pipelines,
10 7
while states are responsible for intrastate pipelines.
Since its inception, OPS has had a poor record as a regulator. In
1978, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that OPS had weak
enforcement, inaccurate records, and ineffective rules. 10 8 Twenty-two
years later, in 2000, the GAO produced another report that criticized the
agency's unwillingness to work with states and weak enforcement.'9
GAO's conclusions were reemphasized by the testimony received for the
Pipeline Safety Act of 2002.110
There was much dissatisfaction with OPS. As of 2001, OPS did
not have even a map of the pipelines it regulated."' Additionally, OPS
had the lowest implementation rate of NTSB recommendations (69

103. Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-304, 110
Stat. 3793 (1996).
104. Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-355, 116 Stat. 2985 (2002)
[hereinafter H.R. 3609 final version].
105. Jeff Nesmith & Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Pipeline Office Is Small Agency with Big Job and
Many Critics,AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 22, 2001 (on file with author).
106. Id.
107. 49 U.S.C. §§ 60104(c), 60105(a) (2000).
108. Nesmith & Haurwitz, supra note 105.
109.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY IS CHANGING How

IT OVERSEES THE PIPELINE INDUSTRY 35 (2000) [hereinafter GAO 2000 Report].
110. See, e.g., Reauthorizationof the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid
Pipeline Safety Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (Mar. 19, 2002) (testimony of Bruce Nilles, Attorney,
Earthjustice Oakland Regional Office) [hereinafter Earthjustice testimony]; Reauthorization
of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Highways and Transit of the House Comm. of Transp. and Infrastructure,
107th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Mark R. Dayton, Dep. Assistant Inspector General
of the U.S. Dep't of Transp.) [hereinafter DOT IG testimony].
111. Mike Madden, Bush: Speed Pipeline Reviews, BELLINGHAM HERALD, Jan. 28, 2001 (on
file with author); DOT IG testimony, supra note 110 (commenting on OPS's reliance on
voluntary submission of mapping data by pipeline operators, "This progress is too little,
too late. OPS should move forward on a rulemaking for mandatory reporting of these data
immediately.").
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percent) of any agency in the Department of Transportation. 112 Even the
pipeline industry as a whole had a higher rate of implementation of
NTSB recommendations (87 percent)" 3 than OPS. The NTSB, 114 the DOT
16
Inspector General," 5 and even the American Petroleum Institute"
criticized the agency's accident data collection methods.
Recognition of the problems at OPS came from both houses of
Congress. For example, Sen. Domenici (R-NM) stated, "Unfortunately
the Office of Pipeline Safety has had a poor history of regulation and
enforcement."11 7 Representatives Dingell (D-MI) and Oberstar (D-MN)
criticized the agency's failure to issue pipeline inspection regulations
despite a six-year-old congressional law requiring them;" 8 Rep. Pascrell
(D-NJ) complained, "there is little or no enforcement of existing
regulations."" 9
V. THE PIPELINE SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2002
A. Legislative History
The 1999 Bellingham pipeline incident led to the first attempt to
reform pipeline safety laws. By the fall of 2000, the Senate had passed S.
2438 and referred it to the House. 120 Although this earlier bill contained
many topics similar to what eventually passed, it was less prescriptive.
Because it was late in the session, the House could only consider
it by suspending its rules, which meant it would take a two-thirds vote

112. Pipeline Safety Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp.,
106th Cong. (May 11, 2000) (testimony of John Hammerschmidt, Member, NTSB).
113. Id.
114.

NAT'L TRANSP.

SAFETY BD.,

EVALUATION OF ACCIDENT DATA

OVERSIGHT OF PETROLEUM PRODUCT PIPELINES 46-47

AND FEDERAL

(1996).

115. ALEXIS M. STEFANI, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T OF TRANSP., AUDIT
REPORT-PIPELINE SAFETY PROGRAM 16-17 (2000) [hereinafter DOT IG AUDIT REPORT].

116. KIEFNER & TRENCH, supranote 97, at 26.
117. 147 CONG. REC. S524 (2001) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
118. Letter from James Oberstar & John D. Dingell, Reps., to colleagues (Sept. 18, 2000)
(asking their colleagues to vote no on S.2438 "to ensure that the House considers a bill that
will prevent future pipeline tragedies"), available at http://www.house.gov/trans
portation.democrats/press/000919_PipelineSafety.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
119. 146 CONG. REC. H7841 (2000) (statement of Rep. Pascrell).
120. King and Tsiorvas Pipeline Safety Act of 2000, S. 2438, 106th Cong. (2000) (as
reported in the Senate Aug. 25, 2000, this bill was named after the two ten-year-olds that
died in the Bellingham explosion; see Katherine Pfleger, NTSB Faults Pipeline Firm in Deadly
1999 Explosion, SEATTLETIMES.COM, Oct. 9, 2002 (on file with author) (describing the two
ten-year-olds Wade King and Stephen Tsiorvas).
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to pass it.12 1 Pipeline safety advocates opposed the bill, arguing that it
was insufficiently prescriptive. The parents of the children killed in
Bellingham criticized the bill's excessive faith in the OPS, saying, "If you
tell an agency to do something 22 times and they ignore you, by what
logic do you think they will pay attention the 23rd time?" 122
Congressman Inslee of Washington said, "I am not a scientist .... But there
is one thing I do know, and that is that nobody has ever gotten a
different result by doing the same thing." 123 Although 59 percent of the
House voted in favor of the bill the Senate had approved, it failed to get
124
the necessary two-thirds majority and was rejected.
In 2001, ten Senators introduced S. 235,125 which the Senate
promptly passed. However, during the months that had passed since S.
2438 was defeated, an intervening election had transferred Congress to
Republican control. House hearings were never scheduled on S. 235. Don
Young, the powerful Chairman of the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, was not a fan of a prescriptive new statute for
pipeline safety. 126 Nonetheless, he did an about face six months later and
introduced his own bill. Two events associated with security and
pipelines may have contributed to his change of heart.
The first event was the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001.
While that did not directly affect pipelines, it raised concerns about
security. Then, just one month later, a lone drunk gunman in Alaska
fired a rifle at the Trans-Alaska pipeline and started a leak, shutting
down one-fifth of U.S. oil production. 127 Coming on the heels of
September 11th, this demonstrated the vulnerability of pipelines to
security breaches.
By December 2001, Young introduced his own bill, emphasizing
security as much as safety of pipelines. 128 Signaling a tough fight for
121. 146 CONG. REC. H9548, 9557 (2000) (statement of Rep. Barton, "But we are late in
the session, so we have put the Senate bill on the floor under suspension of the rules, which
means it will take a two-thirds vote to pass this legislation later this evening.").
122. Marlene Robinson et al., Pipeline Safety: Don't Sacrifice the Good for the Status Quo,
SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 6, 2000 (on file with author).
123. 146 CONG. REC. H9548-01, H9557 (2000) (statement of Rep. Inslee).
124. 146 CONG. REC. H9573 (2000) (the roll call was yeas 232, nays 158, not voting 42).
125. Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2001, S. 235, 107th Cong. (2001).
126. Press Release, Rep. Don Young, Chairman, House Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure (June 27, 2001) (on file with author).
127. Defenders' Environmental Network, SECURITY RISK: Gunman Shoots Hole in
Trans-Alaska Pipeline, Oct. 17, 2001, available at http://www.defenders.org/den/d00051.
html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004) (on file with author).
128. Pipeline Infrastructure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety Act, H.R. 3609,
107th Cong. (2001) (as introduced in the House Dec. 20, 2001) [hereinafter H.R. 3609 as
introduced].
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safety advocates, he explained that his new bill would provide a "less
prescriptive approach." 129 The House referred the bill to Young's
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and Rep. Tauzin's (RLA) Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Chairman Young's committee began work in February 2002,
hearing from one of the parents who lost a child in the Bellingham
32
accident, 130 industry representatives, 131 the DOT Inspector General,
133
and a pipeline employee union representative. In March, Rep. Tauzin's
Committee on Energy and Commerce heard from the NTSB, 134 industry
representatives, 135 a union representative, 136 nonprofit groups with
interest in preventing pipeline spills, 37 and the Administrator of the
DOT Research and Special Programs Administration. 138 Much to Rep.
Young's chagrin,
Rep. Tauzin's committee passed its own bill as a
139
substitute.

129. Press Release, Leadership of House Transp. & Infrastructure Comm. & the Energy
& Commerce Comm., Pipeline Infrastructure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety Act
(Dec. 20, 2001) ("This bill generally differs from other approaches in that it is less
prescriptive...") (on file with author).
130. Robinson testimony, supra note 58.
131. Reauthorization of the Office of Pipeline Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Highways and Transit of the House Comm. on Trans. and Infrastructure (Mar. 19, 2002)
(testimony of William J. Haener, Executive Vice President Natural Gas, CMS Energy Corp.
on behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n of Am.).
132. DOT IG testimony, supra note 110.
133. Reauthorization of the Office of Pipeline Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Highways and Transit of the House Comm. on Trans. and Infrastructure (Feb. 13, 2002)
(testimony of Ryan P. Berg, President, General Workers Committee PACE International
Union) [hereinafter PACE International Union testimony].
134. Chipkevich testimony, supra note 47.
135. INGAA testimony, supra note 60; Reauthorizationof the Natural Gas PipelineSafety Act
and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act: Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Mar. 19, 2002) (testimony of Mark L. Hereth,
Senior Vice President, HSB Solomon).
136. Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline
Safety Act: Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce (Mar. 19, 2002) (testimony of Edward C. Sullivan, President, Bldg. and Constr.
Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO) [hereinafter AFL-CIO testimony].
137. Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline
Safety Act: Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce (Mar. 19, 2002) (testimony of Robert R. Kipp, Executive Dir., Common Ground
Alliance [hereinafter Common Ground Alliance testimony]; Earthjustice testimony, supra
note 110.
138. Reauthorization of the Natural Gas PipelineSafety Act and the HazardousLiquid Pipeline
Safety Act: Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce (Mar. 19, 2002) (testimony of Ellen G. Engleman, Adm'r Research and Special
Programs Admin.., U.S. Dep't. of Transp.).
139. James C. Benton, House Pipeline Security Bill Hindered by Committee Spats on Its Way
to Floor Action, CQ WEEKLY, June 15, 2002, at 1600.
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The two powerful House committees finally negotiated a
compromise 140 and brought the measure to a vote on July 23, 2002, where
it passed almost unanimously. 141 The bill then headed for the Senate
where that chamber's version of the pipeline safety bill was included in
the massive and controversial Energy Policy Act of 2002.142
Ultimately, controversial issues doomed the energy bill (e.g.,
whether to drill in the Alaska Wildlife Refuge), but the conferees
managed to salvage the pipeline safety provisions. 143 The chairmen and
ranking members of the House committees accepted amendments from
their counterparts in the Senate,144 and both the Senate and the House
passed the legislation just one day apart. 145, 146 The president then signed
it on December 17, 2002.147
Despite its introduction in the House as the "Pipeline
Infrastructure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety Act," 14 political
maneuvering stripped away all of the sections expressly addressing
security. 149 The short title of the final bill is "Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2002."150
B. The New Law-Changing the Balance of Power
The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 simultaneously
strengthened OPS enforcement powers while limiting OPS discretion. In
contrast, limits on OPS translated into additional state power and
strengthened the voice of the public in regulatory matters. By placing

140. James C. Benton, PipelineSafety Linked to Energy Measure,CQ WEEKLY, July 27, 2002,
at 2063.
141. H.R. 3609, 107th Cong. (2002) (as engrossed in House) [hereinafter H.R. 3609 as
engrossed in House]; 148 CONG. REc. H5306 (July 23, 2002) (Roll Call. No. 334, the vote was
423 yeas to 4 nays).
142. Energy Policy Act of 2002, H.R. 4, 107th Cong., Subtitle C-Pipeline Safety
(engrossed in Senate, Apr. 25, 2002).
143. Samuel Goldreich, Congress Fails to Reach Deal on Omnibus Energy Legislation; Settles
for Pipeline Safety Bill, CQ WEEKLY, Nov. 16, 2002, at 3027.
144. 148 CONG. REC. S11067-$11069 (2002) (Joint Explanatory Statement submitted by
Sen. Hollings).
145. H.R. 3609, 107th Cong. (2002) as engrossed in Senate [hereinafter H.R. 3609 as
engrossed in Senate]; 148 CONG. REc. S10966 (2002).
146. 148 CONG. REC. H8925 (2002).
147. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104.
148. H.R. 3609 as introduced, supra note 128.
149. Compare H.R. 3609 as introduced, supra note 128, with H.R. 3609 final version, supra
note 104 (Note that the original section 5. Safety Orders and Security Recommendations,
section 11. Security of Pipeline Facilities, and section 14. Pipeline Security-Sensitive Information have all either been deleted or were changed to remove the word "security.").
150. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 1.
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new mandates on the industry, Congress narrowed OPS discretion and
short-circuited OPS foot dragging by making some mandates effective
whether or not OPS completed accompanying regulations. Congress
strengthened the criminal penalties for excavators who damage
pipelines. Furthermore, Congress funded several studies and called for a
major new research effort on certain issues.
C. Reworking the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS)
Section 7. Safety Orders
Section 8. Penalties
Section 18. Implementation of Inspector GeneralRecommendations
Section 19. NTSB Safety Recommendations
Section 20. MiscellaneousAmendments
Section 22. Authorization ofAppropriations
Comparing the new law to its predecessor highlights the
weakness of the old act. Section 7, Safety Orders, illustrates this contrast.
It gives OPS a new power-the power to order necessary corrective
action for a "potential safety related condition." 151 It is stunning to
realize that OPS did not have that authority after more than 30 years of
pipeline safety laws.152 The Office of Pipeline Safety requested this
section so that corrective action could be taken immediately rather than
waiting for an accident to prove that a facility was unsafe. 153
Unsurprisingly, in view of the demonstrated need, this section passed
almost unchanged from the version that was introduced. 154
Section 8, Penalties, 55 increased OPS penalty and enforcement
authority. Historically, enforcement was minimal. Penalties amounted to
less than five cents per barrel spilled. 156 The General Accounting Office
reported that OPS had virtually abandoned fines as an enforcement

151. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 7 (granting the secretary the power to
impose Safety Orders).
152. See Part IV: The Previous Legal Framework for Pipeline Safety supra and supra
notes 98-104.
153. 148 CONG. REC. S11067,11068 (Nov. 14, 2002) (Joint Explanatory Statement).
154. Compare H.R. 3609 as introduced, supra note 128, § 5 ("potentially unsafe
condition"), with H.R. 3609, 107th Cong. as engrossed in the House, supra note 141, § 5
("potentially unsafe condition"), and with H.R. 3609, 107th Cong. § 7 (2002) (engrossed in
the Senate) [hereinafter H.R. 3609 engrossed in Senate] ("potential safety-related condition")
(emphasis added).
155. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 8.
156. Nat'l Pipeline Reform Coalition testimony, supra note 53.
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measure because OPS believed it was more constructive to work with
157
companies rather than argue over fines.
Virtually every committee that considered this issue increased
the penalty authority but as the bill moved through Congress, this
section grew teeth. The bill introduced by Chairman Young merely
increased penalties by 50 to 100 percent.1 58 The House not only increased
the penalties further (100 to 300 percent) but also rewrote the rules for
assessing penalties. The House authorized corrective action if a pipeline
"is or would be" hazardous and required that harm to the environment be
considered in setting penalties. It further permitted the secretary to
consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without
reduction for subsequent damages, narrowed the matters the secretary
must consider in assessing penalties, and strengthened judicial
1
enforcement provisions. 59
The House changes were still not strong enough for the Senate,
however. That chamber insisted that the Comptroller General conduct a
60
study of OPS policies and procedures in assessing and collecting fines.
This study is due within one year of passage of the Act and should keep
the enforcement issue on the front burner. The extensive debate over
penalties suggests that Congress rejected the OPS's "constructive"
approach to enforcement and preferred sterner measures.
Congress gave DOT several prescriptive mandates in sections 18,
Implementation of Inspector General Recommendations, and 19, NTSB
Safety Recommendations. Section 18 requires implementation of the
safety recommendations made by a critical DOT Inspector General (IG)
audit. 16' To assure oversight, Congress required the secretary to submit
progress reports on the implementation of those recommendations every
90 days to oversight committees in the House and the Senate until each
recommendation was completed. This last requirement suggests that
Congress was impatient with OPS intransigence.

157. GAO 2000 Report, supra note 109, at 26 (The GAO reported that OPS proposed
fines in only four percent of enforcement actions in 1998).
158. H.R. 3609 as introduced, supra note 128, § 6.
159. H.R. 3609 engrossed in House, supra note 141, § 6.
160. H.R. 3609 engrossed in Senate, supra note 145, § 8(d).
161. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 18; DOT IG AUDIT REPORT, supranote 115,
at 3-5 (suggesting that RSPA should (1) finalize actions required by laws passed in 1992
and 1996, (2) expand its research into pipeline inspection technologies, (3) train OPS
inspectors on the use and interpretation of internal inspection devices, (4) revise its
accident reporting system, (5) revise regulations to require companies to submit updated
accident reports when required, and (6) establish a timetable for implementing NTSB;
recommendations with which RSPA agreed).
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In section 19, Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation
to formally respond to every pipeline safety recommendation made by
the NTSB. 162 While there was already a general statute that required
DOT responses to NTSB recommendations, 163 the new law removed any
doubt whether Congress intended to include NTSB recommendations
about pipeline safety. The new Act also requires public availability of
DOT responses to NTSB recommendations and annual reporting to
Congress.
If the previous sections did not provide enough direction to OPS,
section 20, under the innocuous title of "Miscellaneous Amendments,"
set out a new purpose for OPS and sought to increase public
involvement.164 Under the old law, OPS regulations were merely
"minimum safety standards." 165 Now, Congress wrote a new purpose
into the law-to provide "adequate protection against risks to life and
property posed by pipeline transportation and pipeline facilities by
improving the regulatory and enforcement authority of the Secretary of
166
Transportation."
To increase public involvement, Congress modified the
membership of OPS's Technical Pipeline Safety Committees (TPSC). By
statute, 167 these Committees advise OPS about the "technical feasibility,
reasonableness, cost effectiveness, and practicability" of proposed
regulations. 68 The fifteen members are divided equally among government, industry, and the public. 69 In the new Act, Congress required that
persons filling the public seats must not have a significant financial
interest in the pipeline, petroleum, or gas industry, assuring truly public
representation. 170
This new section summarizes congressional intent for the new
law: (1) higher safety standards (adequate, not minimum), (2) an agency
more responsive to the public, and (3) an agency better equipped to
withstand industry influence.

162. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 19.
163. Secretary of Transportation's Responses to Safety Recommendations, 49 U.S.C. §
1135 (2000).
164. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 20.
165. 49 U.S.C. § 60102(a)(1) (2000).
166. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 20 (emphasis added).
167. 49 U.S.C. § 60115 (2000).
168. Id. at (c)(2).
169. Id. at (b)(3).
170. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 20; 148 CONG. REG. S11067, 11069 (Nov.
13, 2002).
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In section 22, Authorization of Appropriations, Congress went
beyond pro forma support and appropriated almost nine times more
171
money for pipeline safety than the appropriations a decade earlier.
D. Strengthening the States
Section 4. State Oversight Role
Section 24. State Pipeline Safety Advisory Committees
Although Congress had permitted the states to take over inspections of pipeline companies since the adoption of the first pipeline safety
law, OPS had been summarily refusing to grant many states such
authority. 172
Improving state oversight was included in S. 2438 (the bill that
almost passed Congress in the fall of 2000) 173 and S. 235, which the
Senate approved in February 2001.174 Although Chairman Young did not
propose such measures in his "less prescriptive" bill in December
176
2001,175 the House committees added that provision.
Congress shifted the balance of power from the federal
government to states in section 4, State Oversight Role. Although the
secretary retains sole enforcement authority, 7 Congress enumerated the
requirements for a state to take over inspection authority, thus
narrowing the secretary's discretion to deny that authority to a state. 178
Congress entirely rewrote the procedure for terminating state inspection
authority and permitted the secretary to give an opportunity to correct
deficiencies before ending a state's inspection authority. 179
While the previous law mandated that states inform the
secretary of pipeline safety violations, it did not require the secretary to
respond. 180 Now, section 4 requires the secretary to respond within 60
181
days to state allegations of violations of pipeline safety standards.
171. Compare Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-508 §§ 114, 214, 106 Stat. 3289
(1992) (appropriations totaled $8,005,500) with H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 22
(appropriations for fiscal year 2003 totaled $71,600,000).
172. Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 90-481 § 5, 82 Stat. 720, 722-23 (1968);
see also supra note 54.
173. King and Tsiorvas Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2000, S.2438, 106th Cong. §
9 (2000).
174. Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2001, S.235, 107th Cong. § 9 (2001).
175. H.R. 3609 as introduced, supra note 128.
176. H.R. 3609 as engrossed in the House, supra note 141, § 22.
177. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 4(a)(3).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 4(b).
180. 49 U.S.C. § 60106(b) (2000).
181. H.R. 3609 final version, supranote 104, § 4(c).
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Under the new law, the secretary must either take appropriate
enforcement action or provide written notice to the state explaining why
182
the secretary decided against enforcement. ,183
The Senate added another measure to strengthen state power section 24, State Pipeline Safety Advisory Committees. 84 This provision
requires the secretary to respond within 90 days to recommendations for
improvements from State Pipeline Safety Committees appointed by a
governor. If states take advantage of their strengthened oversight role
and use a Pipeline Safety Advisory Committee, they will have a more
powerful voice at the federal level where pipeline safety is concerned.
E. Strengthening the Voice of the Public
Section 5. Public EducationPrograms
Section 9. PipelineSafety Information Grants to Communities
The NTSB has concluded that educating communities about the
pipelines in their midst would save lives.1 85 Such programs promote the
use of One-Call systems to reduce excavation accidents and explain the
hazards of leaks to residents.18 6 Public education programs have been
part of pipeline safety laws since at least 1976,187 but they have only
188
applied to natural gas pipelines.
Congress added hazardous liquid pipelines to the statutory
scheme in section 5, Public Education Programs. 189 Once again
narrowing the agency's discretion, Congress defined "education" (how
to recognize leaks and what steps to take if a leak is suspected), directed
who was to be educated (municipalities, school districts, businesses, and
residents in the vicinity of the pipeline), and required the secretary to
periodically review these programs. 19°

182. Id.
183. Now that states are statutorily entitled to a decision and explanation, it raises the
possibility that a dissatisfied state could challenge the secretary's enforcement decision
under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
184. Compare H.R. 3609 as engrossed in the House, supra note 141, § 1, Table of Contents
with H.R. 3609 as engrossed in the Senate, supra note 145, § 24.
185.

NATL TRANSP. SAFETY BD., PIPELINE RUPTURE, LIQUID BUTANE RELEASE, AND FIRE,

LIVELY, TEXAS AUG. 24, 1996, at 24-26 (1998) (highlighting a longstanding NTSB concern
about inadequacies of community education about pipelines).
186. Id. at 26.
187. Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-477 § 8, 90
Stat. 2073 (1976).
188. 49 U.S.C. § 60116 (2000).
189. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 5.
190. Id.
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In addition to educating the public about pipelines, in section 9,
Pipeline Safety Information Grants to Communities, Congress
implemented a new federal grant program that provides "technical
assistance" grants to local groups and nonprofit organizations. 191 This
provision opened a great divide between Chairman Tauzin (whose
Committee added the provision) and the bill's sponsor, Chairman
Young, who complained, "I didn't know we were in the business of
funding anti-pipeline activists." 192 His concerns were ultimately resolved
in the Senate when that chamber added an exception to prevent funding
community groups working on the safety of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline
193
in Chairman Young's home state.
The technical assistance grants cannot be used for litigation or
lobbying expenses-they can only be used to pay for engineering and
scientific analysis of pipeline safety issues or for promotion of public
participation in official proceedings. The Senate also required annual
reporting to the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation and
House Energy and Commerce Committees identifying the name and
location of each recipient, outlining the purpose of the grant, and
94
describing how the money was used.
Early versions of the bill also sought to strengthen the voice of
public
by providing a Community Right-to-Know section. That
the
provision did not survive. 195 Although many proponents of pipeline
safety believed that communities with pipelines should have a right to
know about them,196 security concerns post 9/11 made the discussion too
controversial to include in the pipeline safety bill, and it was deferred for
later consideration in the broader context of homeland security
197
legislation.
F. Mandates to Industry
Section 6. Protectionof Employees Providing Pipeline Safety Information
191. Id. § 9.
192. Benton, supra note 140.
193. Compare H.R. 3609 as engrossed in the House, supra note 141, § 7 with H.R. 3609 as
engrossed in the Senate, supra note 145, § 9 (the later Senate version excludes grants for
facilities regulated under Pub. L. No. 93-153, 43 U.S.C. § 1651. That statute pertains to the
Trans-Alaska pipeline.).
194. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 9.
195. Compare H.R. Rep. No. 107-605 Part 1 (showing that, in the version of H.R. 3609
reported out of the Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure, section 6 was titled
"Community-Right-to-Know and Emergency Preparedness") with H.R. 3609 final version,
supra note 104 (lacking a section on Community Right-to-Know).
196. 148 CONG. REC. H5273, H5283-H5285 (July 23, 2002) (statements of Rep. Larsen &
Rep. Dunn).
197. Id. (statement of Rep. Dunn).
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Section 10. OperatorAssistance in Investigations
Section 13. Pipeline Qualification Programs
Section 14. Risk Analysis and Integrity Management Programsfor Gas
Pipelines
Section 15. National Pipeline Mapping System
The DOT's broad discretion was the source of problems in
previous pipeline safety laws. In order to implement a statute, the DOT
Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) uses its
discretion to conduct rulemaking and write regulations interpreting and
defining the statute. Broader discretion gives an agency more leeway in
crafting the regulation's language. In a technical area like pipeline safety,
rulemaking is dominated by industry representatives, with minimal
public input.198 To change that dynamic, in imposing new industry
mandates, Congress involved additional federal agencies in pipeline
safety and narrowed OPS discretion.
Congress authorized the Department of Labor (DOL) to institute
whistleblower protection for employees of pipeline companies by adding
section 6, Protection of Employees Providing Pipeline Safety
Information. 199 The new statute prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees that provide pipeline safety information to their
employer or to the federal government. The DOL will oversee a
complaint procedure that may provide remedies including orders for
back pay, reinstatement, and compensatory damages. Prevailing
employees may also seek litigation expenses including attorney fees and
expert witness expenses.
Union testimony to Congress suggested that pipelines would be
safer if employees could notify regulators about safety problems before
accidents occurred, without fear of retribution from their employers. 200
The Government Accountability Project sought this protection for
employees of Alyeska (the operator of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline). 20'
There was also a suggestion that the management of Olympic Pipe Line

198. By way of illustration, in the recent rulemaking on natural gas pipeline integrity
management, RSPA received over 700 comments from 90 different sources. There were
only 11 representatives of the public (federal/state/local agencies, public interest groups or
individuals). Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas
(Gas Transmission Pipelines); Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,778, 69,782 (Dec. 15, 2003) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 192).
199. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 6.
200. AFL-CIO testimony, supra note 136; PACE International Union testimony, supra
note 133.
201. Press Release, Government Accountability Project, Whistleblower Protection for
Pipeline Workers (Nov. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
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Co. had disregarded employee safety complaints about20 a2 malfunctioning
valve that later contributed to the Bellingham accident.
Whistleblower protection was included in S. 2438 and S. 235,
20 3
which passed the Senate in 2000 and 2001 respectively. While it was
°4
not in Chairman Young's first proposal, his committee added it.2 Under
the new law, employees now have protection if they speak up about
unsafe practices.
In addition to giving employees whistleblower protection, in
section 10, Operator Assistance in Investigations, Congress strengthened
20 5
the "hand" of employees during accident investigations. This section
requires companies to assist in the investigation of accidents. It amended
20 6
two parts of the old statute and was added by the Senate. The old law
merely required that a company permit access to and copying of
records. 207 It did not require owners or operators of facilities to assist in
the investigation of accidents. Under that scheme, employees had no
duty to tell OPS anything even if they were so inclined. The new law
mandates assistance provided that it does not interfere with
constitutional rights (e.g., the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination). It also gives the secretary the authority to direct a
secretary finds the
pipeline operator to relieve an employee of duty if 2the
08
incident.
the
to
contributed
employee substantially
Of course, employees cannot assist in investigations or serve as
whistleblowers if they are not trained in the safe operation and
maintenance of pipelines. Therefore, Congress insisted on meaningful
training for pipeline employees by including section 13, Pipeline
Qualification Programs. 2°9 Once again, Congress narrowed the discretion
given to OPS. Instead of a general training mandate, Congress provided
specific requirements. Employee qualifications must be tested in some
210
way and that testing may not be limited to on-the-job performance.

202. Ericka Pizzillo, Olympic Terminal "Nightmarish" Before Blast That Killed Three,
BELLINGHAM HERALD, May 19, 2002 (on file with author).
203. S. 2438, 106th Cong. § 14 (2000) (as reported in the Senate); S. 235, 107th Cong. § 15
(2001).
204. Press Release, U.S. House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, Bipartisan
Pipeline Safety Legislation Overwhelmingly Approved by House Transportation
Committee; Bill Approved by 55 to13 Vote (May 22, 2002) (on file with author).
205. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 10.
206. Compare H.R. 3609 as engrossed in the House, supra note 141 (which lacks such a
section), with H.R. 3609 as engrossed in the Senate, supra note 154, § 10.
207. 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a)(3) (2000).
208. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 10.
209. Id. §13.
210. Id.
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Testing results must be written. 211 Employers must implement a qualification program within two years of the statute's passage and test all
employees who perform "covered tasks" 212 within 18 months after that.
A special pilot program provides for certification of individuals who
operate computer-based systems for operating pipelines. The secretary
must review all programs within three years. To reduce agency procrastination, Congress required pipeline operators to comply with the statute
requirements whether or not regulations have been written. 213
When this section was introduced, the required training was
limited to pipeline control room operators. 214 However, by the time it
went through the House, it had been largely rewritten and applied to
every employee who performs a "covered task." 215 The Senate
strengthened this section further, permitting waivers from this
requirement only if the waiver was consistent with pipeline safety,
providing that intrastate pipeline operators should be supervised by the
appropriate state regulatory agency, and requiring a report from the
secretary about the qualification program one year earlier than the
House (four years instead of five). 216
While these first three industry mandates addressed personnel
issues, the next one directly affected pipeline integrity. Section 14, Risk
Analysis and Integrity Management Program for Natural Gas Pipelines,
mandated inspection of natural gas pipelines if they were in high217
population areas.
In imposing integrity management requirements on natural gas
pipelines, Congress prescribed timing requirements but left two
important loopholes affecting where and how pipeline integrity must be
managed. With regard to timing, the secretary must implement integrity
management regulations within 12 months of the bill's passage. Pipeline
operators must begin assessing the integrity of their pipelines within 18
months and complete that assessment within ten years. Furthermore, the
highest risk areas must be assessed first and at least 50 percent of those
areas must be assessed within five years. Companies must reassess their
211. Id.
212. For natural gas pipelines, a "covered task" is defined in 49 C.F.R. § 192.801(b); for
hazardous liquid pipelines a "covered task" is defined in 49 C.F.R. § 195.501(b). Essentially,
a "covered task" includes anything required to be done on a pipeline by regulation that is
part of operations and maintenance and affects the operation or integrity of the pipeline.
213. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 13.
214. H.R. 3609 as introduced, supra note 128, § 10.
215. H.R. 3609 as engrossed in the House, supra note 141, § 10.
216. Compare H.R. 3609 as engrossed in the House, supra note 141, § 10 with H.R. 3609
final version, supranote 104, § 13.
217. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 14.
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facilities at a minimum of every seven years. Once again, Congress
removed any incentive for OPS to drag its feet-if the secretary fails to
companies to
issue regulations within 12 months, the statute requires
218
comply with the statute without regulatory guidance.
While Congress was prescriptive about when the risk of pipelines
had to be assessed, Congress gave the secretary discretion to determine
where and how. Surprisingly, Congress did not require that all pipelines
be inspected. The statute says that a risk analysis is required for
"facilities in areas identified pursuant to subsection (a)(1) [49 U.S.C. §
60109 High-density population areas] and defined in chapter 192 of title
219
Neither section
49,...including any subsequent modifications."
60109(a) nor chapter 192 of title 49 define "high-density population
area."220
Adding to the confusion, while the statute uses the term "highdensity population area," members of Congress used the term "high
consequence area" as an apparent synonym for "high-density population
area." For example, in referring to where pipeline integrity management
programs would apply, the Joint Manager's Statement refers to "high
consequence areas." 221 That statement is silent about "high-density
population areas." Similarly, in RSPA's recent rulemakings for gas
pipeline integrity, the agency has defined the term "high consequence
area," not "high-density population area.""' To resolve what Congress
intended by the term "high-density population area," we must resort to
the legislative history.
The Joint Manager's statement for the bill mentions the
Carlsbad, New Mexico, accident where 12 people died in a remote area
and refers to a recently completed RSPA rulemaking that defined where
pipelines must be inspected:

218. Id.
219. Id. § 14(a).
220. 49 U.S.C.A. § 60109(a)(1)(A) (2001); Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management
in High Consequence Areas (Gas Transmission Pipelines), Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,778,
69,778 (Dec. 15, 2003) (noting that the recently adopted rule for High Consequence Areas is
intended to satisfy the statute's requirement to identify high-density population areas).
221. 148 CONG. REC. S11067, 11068-69 (Nov. 14, 2002) (the Joint Explanatory Statement
that is intended as legislative history for the bill describes section 14 as follows: "In this
section, each operator of a gas pipeline facility is required to conduct a risk analysis for
facilities located in high consequence areas and to adopt and implement an integrity
management program for each such facility to reduce associated risks.") (emphasis added).
222. 68 Fed. Reg. 69,778, 69,778 (Dec. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 192) (RSPA
stated that this rulemaking is in satisfaction of the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of
2002).
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The Department of Transportation's Research and Special
Programs Administration (RSPA) issued a final rule
defining "high consequence areas" on August 6, 2002. The
managers strongly support RSPA's regulation defining
high consequence areas, although recognize that the
definition could be subject to alteration by future
regulatory action by RSPA .... In.. .July 2002..., RSPA made
clear its intent to include in its definition known areas
where people gather, such as the Pecos River pipeline
crossing near Carlsbad, New Mexico which was commonly
used by campers and fishermen and was the location of a
pipeline rupture in August 2000 that resulted in 12
fatalities. The managers support is expressed for this new
definition of high consequence areas....223
This statement suggests that the conferees supported an interpretation of
"high-density population area" that included remote areas where people
were known to gather.
This interpretation is consistent with the legislative history for
prior bill versions. The language as to where to inspect pipelines
remained virtually the same throughout the three-year debate. 224
Throughout that process, 17 members of Congress justified imposing
integrity management requirements by referencing the Carlsbad
accident. 25 This suggests that Congress intended "high-density
223. 148 CONG. REC. S11067, 11068-69 (Nov. 14, 2002).
224. Compare S. 2438, 106th Cong. § 5 (calling for inspection in areas "identified
pursuant to subsection (a)(1) [of § 60109]) with H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 14
(calling for inspection in areas "identified pursuant to subsection (a)(1) and defined in
chapter 192 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, including any subsequent
modification...." Note that the earlier law would have also required inspection of
hazardous liquid pipelines but that had already been accomplished through rulemaking
(65 Fed. Reg. 75405-06 (Dec. 1, 2000)), making such a requirement superfluous. The
reference to Chapter 192 added in H.R. 3609 ties the statute to the regulations for natural
gas pipelines.
225. 146 CONG. REc. H7627 (Sept. 14, 2000) (remarks of Congressman Tom Udall, DNM); 146 CONG. REC. E1777 (Oct. 10, 2000) (remarks of Congressman Joe Skeen, R-NM);
146 CONG. REC. H9548 (Oct. 10, 2000) (remarks of Congressman Joe Barton, R-TX); 146
CONG. REC. H9561 (Oct. 10, 2000) (remarks of Congressman Thomas Bliley, R-VA); 146
CONG. REC. H9560 (Oct. 10, 2000) (remarks of Congressman Gene Green, D-TX); 146 CONG.
REC. H7627 (Sept. 14, 2000) (remarks of Jay Inslee, D-WA); 146 CONG. REC. S10894 (Oct. 23,
2000) (remarks of Sen. Trent Lott, R-MS); 146 CONG. REC. E1656 (Oct. 3, 2000) (remarks of
Congressman James Oberstar, D-MN); 146 CONG. REc. H7841 (Sept. 19, 2000) (remarks of
Congressman Bill Pascrell, D-NJ); 146 CONG. REC. H9548 (Oct. 10, 2000) (remarks of
Congressman Max Sandlin, D-TX); 147 CONG. REC. S1176 (Feb. 8, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Jeff
Bingaman, D-N.M.); 147 CONG. REC. S1176-03 (Feb. 8, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Pete
Domenici, R-N.M.); 147 CONG. REC. S1176 (Feb. 8, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Maria Cantwell,
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population area" to mean places where mass casualties might result
from a pipeline rupture, not just urban areas.
The industry argued that it was unreasonable to require pipeline
inspection in remote places like where the Carlsbad accident occurred or
226
other infrequently occupied areas such as near rural churches.
Industry complained because only about 35 percent of natural gas
227
modifying
pipelines would accommodate internal inspection devices;
the remaining pipelines to accommodate these devices would be
extremely costly. 228
To make it easier to comply with integrity management requirements, in section 14, Congress gave the secretary discretion to identify
other methods of inspection that "would provide an equal or greater
level of safety." The secretary has already taken advantage of this
discretion by permitting pipelines to be reassessed within the seven-year
required time frame using a less stringent inspection method than
229
internal inspection or pressure testing. Only time will tell whether this
proves to be a fatal flaw.
While Congress gave the secretary some discretion in section 14,
Congress returned to a prescriptive approach in section 15, National
Pipeline Mapping System.230 Ten years earlier, in 1992, Congress
231
required DOT to create a national inventory of pipelines. By 1999, OPS
23 2
but RSPA never
had completed a standardized mapping system,
233
surprisingly, by
Not
data.
mapping
submit
to
companies
required
D-WA); 147 CONG. REC. S1176 (Feb. 8, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Jon Corzine, D-NJ); 147
CONG. REC. S1176 (Feb. 8, 2001) (remarks of Sen. John Kerry, D-MA); 147 CONG. REC. S1176
(Feb. 8, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Frank Murkowski, R-AK); 147 CONG. REC. S1176 (Feb. 8,
2001) (remarks of Sen. Patty Murray, D-WA).
226. Letter from Terry D. Boss, Senior Vice President, Environment & Safety
Operations, Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n. of Am., to Dockets Facility, U.S. Dep't. of Transp.
3 (Mar. 11, 2002) (on file with author) ("Expecting pipeline operators to identify an area, for
example such as that located at the Carlsbad site.. .is unreasonable... Seldom-used areas
and structures, such as rural churches or in some instances bingo halls, should not be
included in the scope of the proposed rule.").
227. INGAA Pipeline R & D testimony, supra note 94.
228. Letter from Terry D. Boss, Senior Vice President, Environment & Safety
Operations, Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n of Am., to Dockets Facility, U.S. Dep't. of Transp.
9 (Apr. 30, 2003) (on file with author) (suggesting that the cost of compliance could be as
high as $17.6 billion dollars over the next 20 years).
229. Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Gas
Transmission Pipelines); Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,778 69,825 (Dec. 15, 2003) (permitting
pipelines to be reassessed on a seven-year schedule using confirmatory direct assessment
under 49 C.F.R. § 192.939).
230. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 15.
231. See DOT IG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 115, at 10.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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January 2002, companies had only submitted data for 64 percent of the
nation's pipeline mileage, although Congress had mandated a national
inventory ten years earlier. 234
The new law requires that all pipeline operators 235 provide
geospatial data to the National Pipeline Mapping System within six
months of passage of the statute. Operators must identify who has
operational control of the pipeline and must keep the information
236
updated.
G. Making Industry Compliance Easier
Section 16. Coordinationof Environmental Reviews
Section 23. Inspections by Direct Assessment
Along with the many prescriptive mandates of the law, in
sections 16 and 23, Congress made it easier for companies to comply
with the new requirements. When RSPA promulgated regulations for
integrity management of hazardous liquid pipelines, 237 RSPA imposed
three repair deadlines (immediate, 60 days, and 180 days) for pipeline
defects discovered in High Consequence Areas. 238 These deadlines
presented companies with a dilemma, however. Some permits would
take longer to get than the deadline allowed for completion of the repair.
Section 16 resolves that dilemma by providing expedited environmental
review for repair permits. 239
This section was hotly debated. The original proposal by Chairman Young was much broader, including "rehabilitation" of pipelines as
well as "repair"; 240 it permitted the Secretary of Transportation to
terminate the jurisdiction of a federal agency if it did not complete its
review of the project by the secretary's deadline; it also provided that the
secretary could define the purpose and need for the project. 241 None of
those provisions survived in the final version. 242

234. DOT IG testimony, supra note 110 (describing progress as "too little, too late").
235. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 15(a) (excluding distribution and
gathering pipelines).
236. Id.
237. See Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas, 49 C.F.R. §
195.452.
238.

Id. § (h)(4)(i-iii).

239.
240.

H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 16.
H.R. 3609 as introduced, supra note 128, § 13.

241.
Id. (proposing §§ 60133(a) ("pipeline repair and rehabilitation projects"), (f)
("Termination of Jurisdiction"), and (h) ("Purpose and Need").
242. Compare H.R. 3609 as introduced, supra note 128, § 13 with H.R. 3609 final version,
supra note 104, § 16.
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The final language directs the president to establish an Interagency Committee to develop a coordinated environmental review
process. Again, Congress recruited new agencies. The Chairman of the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) chairs that committee (not the
Secretary of Transportation as Chairman Young originally proposed).
Virtually all agencies with responsibilities for permitting activities
243
related to pipeline repair are members. The committee is tasked with
preparing a compendium of best practices for access, excavation, and
restoration of a pipeline repair site and entering into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with those agencies to expedite permitting for
companies who need to repair pipelines. That MOU requires the
unanimous consent of all agencies on the committee, assuring that
environmental protection remains important. This section does not
preempt any federal, state, or local environmental law; therefore, it will
244
expedite repairs, not gut environmental protection.
In section 23, Congress addressed a major concern of the natural
gas industry by requiring the secretary to provide rules for Direct
Assessment (DA), an alternative to internal inspection with a smart pig
245
or hydrostatic testing. OPS does not yet have complete confidence in
246
these methods. The liquid pipeline industry will not incorporate this
method in its integrity management plans, believing it to be
unverifiable. 247 Nonetheless, it is permitted by the new statute and will
assist natural gas companies who have significant mileage of pipeline
that cannot accommodate internal inspection devices.
H. Mandates to Excavators
Section 2. One-Call Notification Programs
Section 3. One-Call Notification of Pipeline Operators
Section 17. Nationwide Toll-Free Number System
One of the main reasons that pipelines are a safe method of
transportation is that they are below ground, away from public
contact. 248 However, out of sight can mean out of mind for excavators
243. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, §16(a) (including, in addition to CEQ and
DOT, seven other agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Land Management).
2
244. Id. § 16(c)( ).
supra note 95.
accompanying
text
See
245.
246. Teleconference Notes: Making Sense of Pipeline Integrity Legislation and Proposed
Regulation" (Feb. 26, 2003), Docket No. RSPA-00-7666-173, at 5 (presentation by Mike
Israni).
247. OGJ Direct Assessment, supra note 95.
248. GAO 2000 REPORT, supra note 109, at 9.
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who may inadvertently breach a large pipeline carrying natural gas or
hazardous liquids.
Excavation damage is arguably the most preventable cause of
pipeline accidents through the use of "One-Call" programs requiring
excavators to call a central utility-locating system. Congress has
regularly addressed One-Call programs in pipeline safety laws.249
Despite those efforts, 250 excavation damage continues to endanger
communities and was one of several factors that led to the 1999
Bellingham pipeline explosion. 251
In section 2, Congress directed the secretary to encourage
adoption of a cooperative industry excavation study, "Common Ground
Study Best Practices,"25 2 and provided funding for that purpose. 253
Congress also required government pipeline operators, excavators, and
contractors to participate in One-Call programs. 254 These sections were
not controversial- they sailed through without amendment. 255
In section 3, Congress enhanced enforcement provisions. In 1992,
Congress had imposed criminal penalties for excavators who damage
pipelines. 256 A subsequent court interpretation, however, made it
virtually impossible to prosecute unless the excavator damaged the
pipeline intentionally. 257 Congress reworded the statute so that the only
intent requirement is that the excavator knowingly and willfully engage
in excavation. If the excavator subsequently damages the pipeline, even
if it is unintentional, he can be prosecuted under this statute provided
that he "knows or has reason to know" 258 of the damage and fails to

249. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-550, at 526-27 (1998); Common Ground Alliance
testimony, supra note 137.
250. See, e.g., Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-129, § 101(2)(A) i-iii, 93 Stat. 989
(1979); Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-561, § 303, 102 Stat.
2805 (1988); Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-508, § 304, 106 Stat. 3289 (1992);
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 7302, 112 Stat. 107
(1998); Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996, 104-304, § 14, 110 Stat.
3793 (1996).
251. NTSB BELLINGHAM REPORT, supra note 12, at 72.
252. The Common Ground Alliance is a nonprofit organization dedicated to shared
responsibility in the damage prevention of underground facilities. See Common Ground
Alliance testimony, supra note 137.
253. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 2(c).
254. Id. § 2(a).
255. Compare H.R. 3609 as introduced, supra note 128, § 2, with H.R. 3609 final version,
supra note 104, § 2.
256. Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-508, § 304, 106 Stat. 3289 (1992).
257. See United States v. Plummer Excavating, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1015 (1999).
258. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, § 3(c).
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be reduced for
notify the pipeline operator. Criminal penalties can 259
operator.
pipeline
the
to
damage
the
reporting
promptly
In an effort to further enhance compliance, section 17 directs the
secretary to establish a single nationwide three-digit telephone number
for One-Call programs. This was requested by Common Ground
promotion of and
Alliance in the belief that it would enable better
260
systems.
notification
compliance with One-Call
I. Studies and Research
Section 11. Population Encroachmentand Rights-of-Way
Section 12. Pipeline Integrity, Safety, and Reliability Research and
Development
Section 25. Pipeline Bridge Risk Study
Section 26. Study and Report on Natural Gas Pipeline and Storage
Facilities in New England
Studies are one way that Congress can acknowledge
controversial or intractable problems without taking action on them.
These sections serve to highlight some rough spots in pipeline safety.
Section 11 requires a study of population encroachment near
pipeline rights-of-way. Presumably, this study will build on a 1988 study
261
by the Transportation Research Board, "Pipelines and Public Safety."
262
That report studied land use issues with respect to pipeline safety. In
section 11, Congress directed the secretary to determine effective
practices for limiting encroachment on pipeline rights-of-way.
Population encroachment around pipelines is a very difficult
issue. Explosions on large natural gas pipelines can kill people hundreds
263
and spills from liquid pipelines may extend
of feet from a pipeline,
264
Keeping people out of harms way
miles away from the pipeline.

259.
260.

Id. § 3(c)(4).
Common Ground Alliance testimony, supra note 137.

261.

TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., PIPELINES AND PUBLIC SAFETY (1988), available at http://

gulliver.trb.org/publications/sr/sr219/SR219_0.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
262. Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-304 §
16(a), 110 Stat. 3793 (1996).
263. To illustrate, the victims of the Carlsbad pipeline accident were camped 675 feet
from where the pipeline ruptured. CARLSBAD NTSB REPORT, supra note 34, at 9.
264. See, e.g., Olympic Pipeline Retrospective, supra note 14, at 4-5 (noting that the gasoline
flowed three miles); NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., PIPELINE ACCIDENT BRIEF EXPLORER

PIPELINE MAR. 9, 2000 DCA-00-MP-005 (2001) (noting that it was originally thought that the
gasoline was stopped 15 miles from the rupture location but discovering later that a lake
seven miles further downstream showed contamination) [hereinafter NTSB EXPLORER
REPORT].
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through the usual zoning mechanisms would require building
restrictions over large areas and could be very controversial.
Section 12 highlights another challenge. It calls for research and
development into improving internal inspection, leak detection,
detection of cracks, corrosion and other abnormalities, and pipeline
security. Section 12 began as a stand-alone bill, H.R. 3929,265 where a
congressional committee made two findings: "(1) Pipelines can become
more susceptible to failure with age; (2)Interruptions in service on major
pipelines.. .can have enormous consequences for the economy and
security of the United States." 266
Despite the importance of this aging infrastructure, establishing
its integrity is an inexact science. Internal inspection devices excel at
detecting corrosion but cannot detect prior excavation damage, minute
cracks, or other stress related damage. 267, 268 Many pipelines cannot
accommodate an internal inspection device. 269 Further research is needed
to improve our ability to ascertain the integrity of this critical
infrastructure.
Congress required two additional studies in sections 25 and
26,270 a study of pipeline bridges and a study of the natural gas
transmission network and natural gas storage facilities in New England.
The Senate added these sections. 271
VI. WOULD THESE CHANGES HAVE PREVENTED PREVIOUS
ACCIDENTS?
The new law was born in the ashes of serious pipeline accidents.
It seems fair to assess its likely effectiveness by analyzing whether it
would have prevented previous accidents.
265. 148 CONG. REC. H5273 (July 23, 2002) (remarks of Rep. Hall); H.R. Rep. No. 107475, pt. 1,§ V.
266. H.R. Rep. No. 107-475, § 2.
267. INGAA Pipeline R & D testimony, supra note 94.
268. By way of illustration, several major accidents have occurred in the last few years
on pipelines that had been recently internally inspected. See, e.g., NTSB EXPLORER REPORT,
supra note 264 (noting that the pipeline had been internally inspected in 1997, only three
years earlier); NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., PIPELINE ACCIDENT BRIEF COLONIAL PIPELINE CO.,
FEB. 9, 1999, DCA99-MP005, at 7 (2001) (noting that the pipeline had been internally
inspected that year and one year earlier); NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., PIPELINE ACCIDENT
BRIEF MARATHON ASHLAND PIPE LINE LLC, JAN. 27, 2000, DCA-00-MP-004, at 2 (2001)
(noting that the pipeline had been internally inspected three years earlier in 1997).
269. INGAA Pipeline R & D testimony, supra note 94.
270. H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, §§ 25, 26.
271. Compare H.R. 3609 as engrossed in the House, supra note 141 (this version does not
contain such sections), with H.R. 3609 final version, supra note 104, §§ 25, 26.
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In combination, stronger excavation protections (sections 2, 3,
and 17), training requirements (section 13), whistleblower protection
(section 6), implementation of the DOT Inspector General recommendations (section 18), and better attention to NTSB recommendations
272
(section 19) might have prevented the Bellingham accident.
273
might have been
Theoretically, the Carlsbad accident
7, 8, 19, 20,
(sections
OPS
better-funded
and
restructured
a
by
prevented
14
(sections
pipelines
gas
for
requirements
and 22), integrity inspection
recommendations
General
Inspector
DOT
the
and 23), implementation of
(section 18), and attention to NTSB recommendations (section 19).
However, according to the just published rule for pipeline integrity
management, 274 only 22,000 miles of the 300,000 miles of transmission
pipelines will be subject to integrity management requirements. This
means that 278,000 miles (92.7 percent) of natural gas transmission
pipeline will remain just like the Carlsbad pipeline -uninspected and
potentially unsafe. That statistic is difficult to understand given the
275
legislative history of the law. Unless pipeline companies adopt more
extensive inspection practices than required by the new law, it appears
that Congress did not do what is needed to prevent another accident like
Carlsbad.
VII. WHAT MORE COULD CONGRESS DO?
It has been said that the two things you do not want to watch
being made are sausage and legislation. That was true here. The
legislative effort started out with a bill named after two of the children
276
Eventually industry lobbying
killed in the Bellingham accident.
weakened the bill so much that the parents of those children withdrew
their support along with their children's names. As is often the case, this
statute is far from perfect and does not please everyone.
Congress pays attention to pipeline safety only when horrific
accidents occur. Certainly, one hopes that bad pipeline accidents are part
of our history, not our future. In case that proves not to be true, the
272. NTSB BELLINGHAM REPORT, supra note 12, at 71.
273. CARLSBAD NTSB REPORT, supra note 34, at 50.
274. Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Gas
Transmission Pipelines), 68 Fed. Reg. 69,815 (Dec. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. §
192).
275. 148 CONG. REC. S11067, 11069 (Nov. 14, 2002) (including recreational areas such as
where the Carlsbad accident happened).
276. King and Tsiorvas Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2000, S. 2438, 106th Cong.
(as reported in the Senate, Aug. 25, 2000) (named after Wade King and Stephen Tsiorvas,
who were killed in the Bellingham accident). See Pfleger, supra note 120.
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following are some suggestions of ways that the present law could be
changed to make pipelines safer.
(1) Strict liabilityfor hazardous liquid pipeline spills. Annually, there
are many more spills per mile from liquid pipelines than gas pipelines. 277
If Congress implemented strict liability for such spills with a penalty
based on the volume spilled, companies would have greater incentive to
avoid spills and reduce spill volume.278
(2) Implement misdemeanor criminal offenses. Shocking as it may
seem, recklessly or negligently operating a pipeline is not a crime. In
other environmental statutes (e.g., the Clean Water Act), 2 79 Congress
provided both misdemeanor and felony penalties. Given the potential
consequences of negligent operation, Congress should provide the same
flexibility for unsafe pipeline operation. In fact, the misdemeanor
penalties of the Clean Water Act already apply to pipeline spills where
they contaminate surface water; providing the same penalties for all
pipeline spills seems reasonable. This would provide a greater incentive
to companies to take an appropriate level of care.
(3) Furtherstrengthen the states. States should be able to take over
pipeline safety laws and their enforcement, similar to the provisions
already in place for the Clean Water Act.280 Additionally, Congress
should expressly permit states to tax pipelines within their borders on a
per mile basis to defray costs of such programs.
(4) Require public enforcement. Although OPS publicized its
proposed fines for both the Bellingham and Carlsbad accidents, 281 to this
date it has never collected them. If OPS had a public enforcement docket
on the web similar to its rulemaking docket,282 the public could monitor
enforcement progress and learn the objections raised by alleged
violators.
277. According to the OPS 2002 statistics, there were 143 accidents on 161,189 miles of
hazardous liquid pipelines and 81 accidents on 307,524 miles of natural gas transmission
pipelines. OPS LIQUID TRANSMISSION SUMMARY,

supra note 8; OPS NATURAL GAS

TRANSMISSION SUMMARY, supra note 8; OPS LIQUID MILEAGE, supra note 23; OPS GAS
MILEAGE, supra note 24.
278. In the event of spills caused by an excavator, the pipeline company could sue the
excavator for the costs of clean up and the fines resulting from the strict liability fine.
279. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2000).
280. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000).
281. Press Release, Dep't of Transp., U.S. Department of Transportation Seeks $3.05
Million Penalty Against Olympic Pipeline (June 2, 2000), available at http://ops.dot.
gov/bellinghaml/PRbellingham.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004); Press Release, Dep't of
Transp., U.S. Department of Transportation Seeks $2.52 Million Penalty Against El Paso
Pipeline for Safety Violations in Pipeline Failure (June 21, 2001), available at http://ops.
dot.gov/press/rspl7Ol.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
282. The docket is available at http://dms.dot.gov (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
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(5) Narrow federal preemption. Preemption is generally based on
the need for uniform regulation. However, pipeline companies often
argue that every pipeline is different and so "one size fits all" is wasteful
and ineffective. 283 If that is true, it suggests that blanket federal
preemption may be unnecessary. Furthermore, the implicit assumption
in special treatment for High Consequence Areas is that pipeline
regulation should not be uniform. In truth, the identification of High
Consequence Areas is indistinguishable from the usual zoning decisions
made by local governments. If the federal government merely set
operational requirements for High Consequence Areas, local
governments could decide whether to impose such protections in any
specific area.
(6) Incentives for replacement of old pipelines. There is abundant
284
The federal
evidence that newer pipelines are safer than old ones.
government should provide a streamlined permitting process and tax
incentives to replace old pipelines where a leak could impact High
Consequence Areas.
(7) Require inspection of all pipelines or require posting of pipelines
2
85
inspected. Internal inspection devices were invented in 1965.
not
that are
Yet today, more than 65 percent of pipelines still will not accept these
devices. 286 As a pipeline ages, if there is no requirement to monitor its
integrity, that amounts to a willingness to discover integrity failure by a
rupture. If the Congress will not require inspection, it should at least
require prominent posting of the area as to how much distance one
should keep. This would also discourage population encroachment
around pipelines.
(8) Move pipeline safety to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). Congress has given the OPS clearer, more defined statutory
requirements. But if pipeline safety does not improve, OPS should be
dismantled and the responsibility shifted to the EPA. This undoubtedly
is the kind of suggestion that, as one industry member put it, "make[s]
sweat." 287
some old timers shudder and today's pipeline managers
be worse, 288
However, since pipeline safety regulation could hardly
substantial change would be warranted if it does not improve.

283.

Memphis Light, Gas & Water testimony, supra note 63.

284.

KIEFNER & TRENCH, supra note 97, at 37-38.

285. Varco InternationalTubular Services, available at http://www.varco.com/investor/
annual/ V2001AR/varco/tube.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
286. INGAA Pipeline R & D testimony, supra note 94.
PIPE LINE & GAS INDUSTRY, available
287. Joseph C. Caldwell, Public's Concern Accelerates,
9
9
at http://www.pipe-line.com/archive_01-0 /01-O -safety.htnd (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
288. 148 CONG. REC. H5273 (remarks of Rep. Doggett).
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(9) Impose financial responsibility requirements on pipeline
corporations. Large corporations can shield themselves from liability for
poor safety practices through certain strategies, such as holding assets
that may generate liability (e.g., pipelines) in subsidiaries or as shares of
separate corporations. 289 As part of this strategy, the parent corporation
drastically undercapitalizes its subsidiary. 290 In the case of pipelines, this
is common. 291 It is not unusual for a pipeline company to be capitalized
by virtually 100 percent debt, lent by the large corporate shareholders. In
fact, this was true of the Olympic Pipeline in Bellingham. 292 In a major
spill like Bellingham, the undercapitalized pipeline company is forced
into bankruptcy if the owners decline to provide further financing. 293 Of
course, in the usual bankruptcy, the shareholders lose the company to
the debt holders, but in this case, those are the same entities. Bankruptcy
presents no meaningful threat to these shareholders but it does allow
pipeline companies to avoid financial consequences for inadequate
safety measures. 294 Congress should impose financial responsibility
requirements for pipelines as it already does for liquefied natural gas
295
facilities.
(10) Enhance the power of citizens to bring suits. Congress has
limited the circumstances under which a citizen can bring an
enforcement action under the pipeline safety laws. 296 Unlike other
environmental laws, 297 Congress has denied citizens the right to sue for
failure to develop required regulations. 298 Increasing the rights of private
citizens to bring such suits would help give the OPS more "backbone."

289. Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 19 (1996).
290. Id. at 22.
291. Olympic Pipe Line Co., Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n., Order Granting Interim
Relief, In Part, Docket No. TO-011472, at 7-8 (2002) (noting that a capital structure at or
approaching 100 percent debt is not unusual in the pipeline industry).
292. Id. at 7 (noting that "Olympic has no equity in its capital structure. Its capital
structure consists of 100% debt.").
293. Id.; Steve Miletich, Olympic Pipe Line Seeks Bankruptcy, SEATrLETIMES.COM, Mar. 28,
2003 (on file with author).
294. Miletich, supra note 293.
295. 49 U.S.C. § 60111 (2000) (financial responsibility for liquefied natural gas facilities).
296. Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60121 (2002).
297. Compare Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000) (granting jurisdiction to district
courts to compel agency action unreasonably delayed), with Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §
60121 (lacking similar language).
298. Friends of the Aquifer, Inc. v. Mineta, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1299 (2001).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 was brought on by
tragedy. Pipelines can and should be safer. This Act mandates steps that
many responsible industry members probably had already taken
voluntarily. Educating affected communities, training employees, and
inspecting aging hazardous facilities are eminently reasonable measures.
Yet, experience has shown that not all companies do what they should to
protect people around their pipelines. Some do only what the law
requires. Pipeline safety laws must be sufficient to protect the public.
In addition to the safety of communities, Congress had a larger
concern -the challenge of siting new pipelines in the face of high profile
fatal pipeline accidents. One member even raised the possibility that
299
such accidents would lead to a moratorium on new pipelines. Another
stated, "We.. .want...communities to be comfortable that future
pipelines.. .are good things for their region, and that they are operated as
safely as possible."30 If siting new pipelines were to grow more difficult,
that would reduce the options for addressing the nation's increasing
energy needs. Congress wanted to preserve those options.
For any single pipeline company, the balance between safety and
the nation's need for new pipelines is very different. Faced with the
certain cost of mapping, inspecting, and repairing, an individual
company might conclude that the work is not worth the expense.
It remains to be seen whether this law will be sufficient. Integrity
management requirements will not apply to the vast majority of natural
gas pipelines. The willingness of OPS to enforce the new rules remains to
be seen. Concerns over terrorism have restricted the availability of
pipeline information, stifling public involvement. All of these issues are
significant challenges. Only time will tell.

299. 146 CONG. REC. H9557 (Oct. 10, 2000) ("We are leading to a moratorium on
pipelines until we get our own act together...." (statement of Rep. Pascrell)).
300. 148 CONG. REC. H5273 July 23, 2002) (statement of Rep. Barton) (emphasis added).

